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VALUING INSIDE KNOWLEDGE: POLICE INFILTRATION
AS A PROBLEM FOR THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
JACQUELINE E. ROSS*
* For six months a federal prosecutor targets Henry Jones, sus-
pected of selling cocaine. From Jones' tapped telephone, the govern-
ment records conversations that appear drug-related, though the
quantities, prices, and the type of product remain cryptic. Eventually,
prosecutors send an informant to Jones, who agrees to obtain five
kilograms of cocaine for the informant's associate, an undercover
police officer. During the transaction, Jones calls the cocaine "tires"
and uses other code terms to refer to the price. This terminology
makes it possible to interpret the drug codes he used during the pre-
viously intercepted phone calls. The police arrest Jones when he
hands the drugs over to the undercover agent. Jones is charged with
possession of five kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute. The
government never charges him with any offenses stemming from the
government's wiretap investigation. At trial, however, the court ad-
mits intercepted calls during which Jones offers "tires, really good
quality" for sale to a variety of customers. The undercover agent testi-
fies that during the drug deal Jones referred to each kilogram of co-
caine as a "tire." The jury convicts. At sentencing, the court relies on
the intercepted calls to conclude that Jones has trafficked in two to
three kilograms of cocaine a week over a six-month period. The judge
increases Jones' sentence accordingly. If the prosecution had offered
the intercepted calls to convict Jones of his weekly sales, it would
have had to establish his guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
But since the tapes merely adjust Jones' sentence after conviction for
the five-kilogram sale, the court reviews them under a "preponder-
ance of the evidence" standard.
• An informant tells the police that prison guard Cynthia Smith
is smuggling narcotics into jail for a variety of inmates, including
* Associate Professor (designate), University of Illinois College of Law; former Assistant
United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) (1990-2000). For help and
advice, the author would like to thank Claire Finkelstein, Leo Katz, Scott Levine, Jennifer
Mnookin, Mark Rosen, Richard Ross, and Ralph Ruebner.
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Edna Baines. At the direction of the police, the informant provides
Smith with fifty grams of crack cocaine, which she smuggles into
prison and delivers to Baines. The police arrest both Smith and
Baines. Smith, Baines, and other inmates tell the government that
Smith has smuggled user quantities of marijuana into prison on previ-
ous occasions. Telephone records and testimony from other prison
guards corroborate these accounts. Smith is convicted of distributing
fifty grams of crack and sentenced accordingly.
I. INTRODUCTION: Two USES OF POLICE INFILTRATION
Should anything trouble us about these fairly routine undercover
operations'? Commentators have pointed to a number of potentially
disturbing features. Were the government's methods unduly intru-
sive? 1 Did the undercover agents use undue pressure or incentives to
encourage the offense?2 Such pressures or incentives could support a
defense of entrapment.3 Critics might condemn the sting operation
against Smith as a form of "sentencing entrapment" in which the po-
lice selected the drug type and quantity in order to trigger a higher
penalty.' The use of "other acts" evidence at trial is also controver-
sial.5 And many commentators protest the use of a preponderance
standard to prove uncharged offenses at sentencing.
6
1. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1,
105 (1991) (noting intrusiveness of undercover operations along with their tendency to erode
trust in the government, and concluding that while "one might argue that undercover activity
should be banned... lalt the least, judicial authorization should be obtained prior to any non-
exigent undercover activity").
2. See generally ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT (Gerald M. Caplan ed., 1983); GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE
SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA (1988).
3. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 371 (1958) (entrapment occurs when person
acting on behalf of government "convince[sj an otherwise unwilling person to commit a criminal
act"); see also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932) (government may not "implant
in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its
commission in order Ito] prosecute").
4. See generally Daniel L. Abelson, Comment, Sentencing Entrapment: An Overview and
Analysis, 86 MARO. L. REV. 773 (2003); Jeff LaBine, Note, Sentencing Entrapment Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Activism or Interpretation?, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1519 (1998);
Joan Malmud, Comment, Defending a Sentence: The Judicial Establishment of Sentencing
Entrapment and Sentencing Manipulation Defenses, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1359 (1997); see also
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, app. n.14 (permit-
ting downward departures for some forms of undercover manipulation affecting volume of drug
sales).
5. Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly
Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 526 n.31 (1983) (arguing, inter alia, that
"[evidence of prior crimes or acts should not be automatically admissible under Rule 404 when
[Vol 79:1111
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Without rejecting these criticisms, I want to call attention to a
problem typically overlooked. In each scenario, the government used
undercover methods to investigate suspicions about the target's
criminal activities. But the government did not use the offense which
it facilitated-what I will term a "contrived offense"-to convict the
target of the suspected crimes. (I will call the wrongdoing that origi-
nally attracted police interest the "independent crime," since this
conduct occurred prior to and independent of government interven-
tion.) Instead of prosecuting the independent crime, the government
convicted the target of the contrived offense. Prosecuting this con-
trived offense became a substitute for proving the independent crime
that originally motivated police infiltration. In addition, once the gov-
ernment convicted the target of a contrived offense, it increased pun-
ishment by introducing at sentencing the uncharged crimes that
initially provoked its investigation. In this fashion, the government
successfully bypassed any need to persuade a jury of those independ-
ent crimes by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The problem here is not just that the government relegated the
independent crimes to the sentencing phase, thereby circumventing
the role of the jury along with the burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. The deeper problem is that the government substituted
prosecution of the easier-to-prove contrived offense for the harder-
to-prove independent crime in circumstances where the evidence ob-
tained undercover could have been used to prosecute the independ-
ent crime. Proving the independent crime would have been better for
two reasons. First, allowing the government to prove the contrived
offense diverts investigative resources from clearing up independent
crimes that occur without government influence. In pursuit of an easy
conviction, police and prosecutors shift from exposing existing inde-
pendent crime to demonstrating the readiness of targets to commit
contrived offenses if given the opportunity.
Second, proving the contrived offense instead of the independent
crime for which it substitutes gives infiltrators little reason to mini-
mize their distorting influence on targets. And it gives juries little
offered [for some permissible purpose] .... Rule 404(b) cannot be used to ... permi[ti clearly
prejudicial evidence to be admitted on a flimsy pretext.").
6. See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1202-03
(1993); Jacqueline E. Ross, What Makes Sentencing Facts Controversial? Four Problems
Obscured by One Solution, 47 VILL. L. REV. 965 (2002); Lauren Greenwald. Note, Relevant
Conduct and the Impact of the Preponderance Standard of Proof Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Denial of Due Process, 18 VT. L. REV. 529, 530 (1994).
2oX)1
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opportunity to correct for that influence in weighing undercover evi-
dence. Imagine an alternative (which I will develop later in this
essay). Suppose the government were required to use the contrived
offense only to illuminate the prior, independent crimes. To convict
Jones or Smith of the independent crimes, the government would
have to present direct evidence of those crimes. The contrived offense
would only serve to corroborate that evidence. Using the undercover
evidence in this way would expose and thus control for the infiltra-
tor's distorting influence on the target. Would Smith have smuggled
fifty grams of crack into prison had the investigator not suggested
both the type of drug and the quantity? If the government could use
the evidence of crack smuggling only to corroborate the marijuana
offenses (i.e., the independent crimes), it would need to offer evi-
dence to prove that Smith smuggled marijuana into jail on previous
occasions. The prosecution's case would thus automatically expose
that Smith smuggled crack under government influence. The distort-
ing effect of the infiltration would be revealed.
Section II will develop my suggestion that we view the prosecu-
tion of contrived offenses in lieu of hard-to-prove independent crimes
as a "shortcut" to conviction. Section III will identify structural rea-
sons that tempt police and prosecutors to use infiltration to generate
these shortcuts. Sections IV and V will suggest a way to regulate
shortcuts through an amendment to the rules of evidence that builds
on "best evidence" principles. Section VI will explore the implications
of my proposal for the roles of the prosecutors and the police, for plea
bargaining, and for sentencing. Finally, in the Conclusion, I will look
beyond the problem of shortcuts to identify other ways in which infil-
trators' influence on the crimes they investigate may compromise the
value of their findings as evidence.
II. THE PROBLEM STATED: UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS AS
INSIDE KNOWLEDGE OR AS A SHORTCUT TO CONVICTION
Infiltrating criminal organizations with undercover agents and in-
formants allows the government to gain inside knowledge, either
from the vantage of a participant in crime, or (in the case of many
decoy stings) from the perspective of a victim.' Valorized as "proac-
tive" weapons against crime, undercover police tactics promise jurors
7. See generally MARX, supra note 2.
[Vol 79:1111
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a ringside seat to criminal activity, often in the early planning stages.8
Undercover operations create a vantage point not ordinarily available
to police and prosecutors who rely on reactive methods of investiga-
tion (like questioning witnesses and issuing subpoenas for docu-
ments). Covert infiltration is an especially powerful weapon against
organized crime because it can reveal structures of hierarchy, divi-
sions of responsibility, and many otherwise inaccessible details about
the inner workings of secretive organizations.9 It has also been widely
deployed against a variety of legitimate enterprises, such as stock
exchanges, in which illegitimate practices coexist secretly with lawful
ones."° But the cost of obtaining inside knowledge is some degree of
involvement with the criminal organization being investigated. To
gain knowledge, the investigator must be an insider. To be an insider,
the investigator must be a participant (either as victim or accomplice).
By participating, the investigator affects the course of events. Indeed,
the better an investigator positions herself to learn firsthand about
the doings of a criminal gang, the more she risks altering what she
seeks to observe.
These features of undercover policing are both its strength and
its weakness. The target's participation in offenses contrived by cov-
ert agents can illuminate independent crimes by corroborating direct
evidence such as informant testimony, financial records, and wire-
tapped telephone conversations. But the ability of undercover agents
to set up easy-to-prove contrived offenses presents a temptation to
overworked law enforcement personnel in a system providing defen-
dants with extensive protections. Prosecuting contrived offenses in
place of independent crimes reverses the legitimating logic of under-
cover investigations, for proof of contrived offenses can substitute for
proof of the independent crimes that justified the sting operation in
the first place. Thus while the government might deploy undercover
agents to reveal organizational hierarchies and divisions of labor be-
tween members of organized crime, it is tempted to use covert tactics
more cheaply and conveniently to convict a target for the offenses the
government aids or encourages.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW Enforceient, supra note
2, at vii; UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE I is (Cyrille
Fijnaut & Gary T. Marx eds., 1995).
2004]
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The undercover "buy-bust" operation best illustrates the use of
infiltration to generate shortcuts (that is, to set up contrived offenses
that can be prosecuted instead of independent crimes). In a buy-bust
operation, an undercover agent asks the target to sell him drugs. The
quantity is often high enough to trigger the application of a manda-
tory minimum prison term, even though that amount may be more
than the target's usual transaction." When the target sells the re-
quested drugs, the agent arrests him. The government does not
charge the target with the narcotics crimes he commits every day, a
decision that would treat the contrived offense as a device for cor-
roborating proof of the independent crimes. Instead, prosecutors
charge the target with the (often larger) narcotics sale that the gov-
ernment requested. In this way, police infiltration changes the origi-
nal object of inquiry from the independent crime to the more readily
observable and provable contrived offense. In the eyes of police and
prosecutors, the advantage of this tactic is that it makes it easier to
prosecute a target who they know is committing similar crimes on his
own. The cost, however, is a shift in the focus of investigation from
those crimes the defendant commits without police assistance to the
contrived offense that the police facilitated. At trial, the contrived
offenses will not be offered to prove the defendant's independent
crimes, though the defendant's participation in these crimes suppos-
edly motivates and legitimates the undercover operation. Instead the
independent crimes-what prosecutors often call "historical" to dif-
ferentiate them from contrived offenses-need not be proved at all. If
the government does try to prove them, the government typically
offers evidence of independent crimes as "intricately related" to
proof of the contrived offense; or as "other acts" evidence under Rule
404(b); or to rebut a defense of entrapment by establishing the tar-
get's criminal predisposition. Thus an irony: the independent crimes
that inspired the undercover investigation in the first place are treated
merely as evidence useful in convicting the defendant of the contrived
offense or in enhancing the penalty.
One might think about this shortcut by analogy to the introduc-
tion of the mongoose into Martinique. Oral tradition, as offered by a
tour guide of uncertain reliability, has it that the mongoose was first
brought to Martinique to kill snakes. But instead of killing snakes,
mongooses attacked the farmers' chickens. The reason was simple:
11. See supra note 4 (discussing sentencing entrapment, and its limited applicability).
[Vol 79:11 It
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chickens are easier to kill. Like the mongoose, which has the capacity
to kill snakes with much effort, the government has the ability to con-
duct lengthy and complicated investigations to prove independent
crimes. But why record hours of tedious hard-to-interpret wiretap
recordings when a contrived "buy-bust" will deposit the target in jail
more quickly and reliably? Police and prosecutors are rewarded for
obtaining convictions, for getting the "stat," and they gain little for
elegant and patient work. Like the mongoose, they prefer chickens to
snakes.
Allowing the government to charge a contrived offense in its own
right deflects focus from independent crimes-which may or may not
be troubling. In some circumstances, concentrating on a contrived
offense might be justified as a necessary substitute for investigating
the independent crime. Since undercover agents cannot witness the
independent crime, they must put themselves in a position to watch
its closest facsimile. When investigators offer bribes to officials whom
they suspect of being corrupt, for example, the government's inter-
vention may be justifiable. Investigators are unlikely to catch officials
taking bribes unless agents offer the cash themselves. Once the police
arrest an official for corruption, they may well learn more about other
instances in which the official accepted bribes. But if they do not, then
the best they can do is prove the contrived offense. Prosecuting a con-
trived offense in place of an independent crime is not per se problem-
atic. The danger arises when the government could prove an
independent crime but chooses instead to charge the more clear-cut
contrived offense. Only then can one speak of a shortcut.
The temptation to substitute proof of contrived offenses for in-
dependent crimes is not endemic to all covert investigations. For
many kinds of undercover investigations it makes no sense to distin-
guish contrived offenses from independent crimes. Suppose a man is
looking for a hired killer to murder his wife. A covert agent masquer-
ades as a hit man and offers his services. The husband offers the agent
a contract and is arrested. The independent crime under investigation
is solicitation to murder. This is also the offense that the agent facili-
tates. In this context, there is no shortcut problem. The independent
crime and the contrived offense are the same.
The shortcut problem most commonly arises in undercover in-
vestigations of transactional crimes like dealing in drugs, weapons, or
stolen goods. When agents offer themselves as a partner to an illegal
transaction, they gain access to criminal networks at their point of
2004]
CHICAGO-KENT LA IV REVIEW
greatest vulnerability, namely their dealings with outsiders. Agents
can replicate otherwise hidden independent crimes by purchasing
weapons, offering to launder drug money, or fencing stolen goods.
The contrived offenses could be used to gather inside information
about an organization's suppliers, structure, and scope. In a corrup-
tion investigation, paying a bribe to obtain desired official action can
confirm difficult-to-verify information about similar offenses. It can
also help interpret circumstantial evidence, such as inflows and out-
flows of cash. The arrest itself can lead witnesses to come forward
with information. In all these ways, contrived offenses can help the
government build a case on independent crimes. Alternatively, the
contrived offenses can be used as an end in themselves: to convict
targets of the contrived offenses instead of the independent crimes.
The higher the penalties for the contrived offense, the greater is the
temptation to prosecute it in its own right instead of the independent
crimes.
The danger of using undercover policing to generate shortcuts
has been recognized in other legal systems, if obliquely. Consider
Germany. German regulation of undercover policing evinces a special
concern for the shortcut problem. German sentencing law gears pun-
ishment to harms and risks of harms. In sentencing defendants for
contrived offenses, German courts treat the involvement of under-
cover agents as reducing the risk of harm.12 For every contrived of-
fense, there is some discount at sentencing because the police
presence prevented a potential harm from reaching fruition (for ex-
ample, by seizing drugs before they reach the market). 3 This discount
also reflects an uncertainty about what the contrived offense tells us
about the crimes a target would commit when left to her own devices.
The more contrived the undercover scenario, the less the risk that the
defendant would have engaged in similar conduct without govern-
ment influence, and hence the greater the discount. 4 How "con-
trived" the offense appears depends on what else the court knows
about the offender. The less evidence the government offers of inde-
pendent crimes, the less willing courts are to conclude that the defen-
dant would have, say, sold the same kilogram of drugs to someone
other than the undercover agent. The dealer might have sold less, or
12. BGHSt32, 345, BGHStV 1989, 528; BGHStV 1994.
13. Id.
14. Lars Kutzner, Betnerkungen zur Vereinbarkeit der sog. Strafzumessungs-Loesung des
BG H mit de Gundsaetzen des Sirafzumessungsrechts, Strafvcrtcidiger (2002).
[Vol 79:1111
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she might not have sold at all. In order to justify a sentence for the
contrived offense that is commensurate with the sentence it would
receive as an independent offense, investigators must seek out evi-
dence of independent crimes. Thus the German approach highlights
the relevance of the independent crime to the proper evaluation of
the contrived offense. 5 To the extent the available penalties for con-
trived offenses correlate with the strength of the government's evi-
dence about independent crimes, German investigators have an
incentive to seek out evidence of such crimes to correct for the dis-
torting influence of the infiltrator.
III. WHY OUR SYSTEM ENCOURAGES SHORTCUTS
Prosecuting a contrived offense is a shortcut when the govern-
ment could use the same evidence to convict the defendant of an in-
dependent crime. But what features of our legal system encourage
investigators to shift their focus of inquiry to contrived offenses and
away from independent crimes? There are a number of ways in which
our legal system frees investigators from the task of clearing up inde-
pendent crimes, thereby permitting them to obtain convictions for
contrived offenses instead. First, prosecutors and the police have dis-
cretion in selecting which crimes to investigate. Without a principle of
compulsory prosecution, they need not pursue every reported of-
fense. They can select the most readily provable crimes and the most
accessible targets, even if the result is an incomplete picture of a tar-
get's criminal activities. Having discretion allows the police and
prosecutors to shift their resources from reactive techniques designed
to solve a particular crime to proactive techniques, including under-
cover policing, which emphasize prevention over detection and target
diffuse "crime problems" rather than specific reported offenses. The
police may initially target someone because they suspect him of par-
ticular independent crimes. But because prosecutors have discretion
in the selection of charges, the government need not charge the target
with the crimes it suspected, even if the results of the sting confirm
the suspicions. Accordingly, prosecutors are free to charge contrived
offenses instead.
15. 1 do not wish to import into American law the German solution of using sentencing
reductions to remedy the shortcut problem. The German approach still focuses primarily on the
offender's predisposition to commit contrived offenses, which is essentially a concern about
entrapment. Where predisposition can be established, the German system still allows prosecu-
tors to charge contrived offenses even when independent crimes are provable.
20(A I
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A second reason why police and prosecutors are free to shift
their focus to contrived offenses is that our legal system allows them
tremendous leeway in their selection of investigative methods. By
contrast, German investigators have to obtain advance judicial au-
thorization to use infiltration.16 They must show that other, less intru-
sive investigative means have failed to yield usable evidence.
American investigators need not do so. American criminal procedure
recognizes no hierarchy of investigative resources, even though inves-
tigative techniques differ in their intrusiveness. American investiga-
tors need not begin their investigation with an inquiry into
"historical," independent crimes. Nor need they employ less invasive
investigative means before launching an undercover operation.
American investigators often find that undercover transactions yield
the quickest results. (Instead of having to wait for their suspects to
act, undercover investigators can be proactive and take the initiative
by offering criminal opportunities to willing targets.) This flexibility in
choice of tactics offers American investigators incentives to use un-
dercover tactics as a substitute for, rather than an auxiliary to, con-
ventional investigative techniques. Once again, prosecutors can
readily deflect their focus from "historical," independent crimes to
offenses they help into being.
There is one pronounced exception to prosecutors' freedom to
select among investigative techniques. The American legal system
requires a particularly rigorous set of findings before authorizing elec-
tronic surveillance. This exception constitutes the third reason why
our system is tempted to prove contrived offenses in place of inde-
pendent crimes. It is not sufficient for prosecutors who seek judicial
authorization to conduct electronic surveillance to show that there is
probable cause to believe that certain specified crimes have been
committed. They must also demonstrate that other investigative
means, including the use of undercover agents and informants, will
not yield sufficient evidence to convict.'7 Accordingly, investigators
must actually consider infiltration before they will be permitted to
resort to electronic surveillance. The basis for this preference is
straightforward: electronic surveillance counts as a "search," and
therefore implicates the target's Fourth Amendment rights. Infiltra-
16. StPO It0a; Koerner-Scherp, BtmG § 31 at 105, 106 (5th ed. 2001).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2000) (to satisfy necessity requirement, an application for a
wiretap order must include "a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investiga-
tive procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to
succeed if tried or to be too dangerous").
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tion does not. According to the Supreme Court, offenders assume the
risk of betrayal by their associates, including the danger that such
associates will turn out to be informants or undercover agents.' s Infil-
tration therefore infringes no reasonable expectation of privacy. As a
result, investigators need not establish probable cause or even rea-
sonable suspicion as a predicate for infiltration. If undercover agents
or informants tape-record conversations with targets, this does not
count as electronic surveillance and therefore requires no judicial
authorization. 19 Since the agent is allowed to infiltrate and testify
about the resulting conversations, he is equally free to record them.
The recording will count as the functional equivalent of his testimony.
It is true that investigators may use infiltration and electronic surveil-
lance in tandem.20 Nonetheless, the hurdles that prosecutors face in
obtaining approval for electronic surveillance, the cost in time and
manpower, the legislated preference for infiltration, and the paucity
of legal restraints give investigators every reason to prefer infiltration
to electronic surveillance. Prosecutors therefore use covert agents as a
substitute for, rather than an auxiliary to, phone tapping and bugs.
The restrictions on electronic surveillance redirect investigators from
listening to conversations about independent crimes to stimulating
conversations and contriving offenses they may more easily record.
There is a fourth way that the legal system encourages investiga-
tors to prove contrived offenses in place of independent crimes. The
substantive criminal law often targets core criminal conduct, which
may be difficult to detect, by turning peripheral manifestations of
crimes into separate offenses. The existence of offenses like money
laundering and obstruction of justice make it possible to punish
wrongdoers for acts of concealment when it is too difficult to prose-
cute them for the crimes they cover up. Thus money laundering and
obstruction can substitute for proof of past crimes, relieving the gov-
ernment of the need to prove that the defendant himself committed
these crimes. Possession offenses play a similar role. Charging the
possession of burglary tools obviates the need to catch an offender in
the attempt. Charging the possession of stolen property makes it
unnecessary to establish that the defendant had a hand in the theft.
18. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302
(1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211-12 (1966).
19. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (upholding constitutional validity of war-
rantless interception recorded with the knowledge and consent of a cooperating interlocutor)-
20. They may do so, for example, when undercover buys will not by themselves reveal the
full hierarchical structure of the targeted organization.
20041
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Charging the possession of cocaine makes it unnecessary to prove a
transaction, let alone the network that supports it. And charging pos-
session of drug paraphernalia makes it unnecessary to prove even the
possession of narcotics. If money laundering and obstruction substi-
tute for proof of past crimes, possession offenses can substitute for
proof of crimes that a target has not yet committed or even at-
tempted, relieving the government of any need to prove that the tar-
get was going to commit them. Since legislatures allow prosecutors to
charge second-order crimes (like possession, money laundering, and
obstruction of justice) that arise out of a first-order crime (say, bur-
glary), and since these second-order crimes are typically easier to
detect, our system encourages investigative techniques such as under-
cover stings that yield evidence of those second-order crimes.21
Allowing the government to prove second-order crimes in place
of more elusive first-order crimes not only invites greater reliance on
covert policing. It also establishes a precedent for the use of eviden-
tiary shortcuts. If the government may prosecute accessible periph-
eral crimes in lieu of hard-to-detect core offenses, it makes sense also
to allow the government to prosecute easy-to-prove contrived of-
fenses in place of hard-to-prove independent crimes. The structure of
the criminal law compounds the temptation to prosecute contrived
offenses instead of independent crimes because the availability of
possession charges makes contrived offenses even simpler to prove
than they otherwise would be. It is already easier to convict Smith of
smuggling crack into prison than of smuggling marijuana, since the
crack offense was contrived and therefore monitored by the govern-
ment. Charging Smith with simply possessing crack cocaine may be
too tempting to forego.
If the availability of second-order offenses like possession legiti-
mates and encourages shortcuts, it also compounds one shortcut with
another. As Markus Dubber has argued, statutes that criminalize pos-
session invite the police to alter their focus from clearing up crimes to
incapacitating dangerous persons.22 Charging Smith with a contrived
possession offense not only shifts investigative focus from a core of-
fense (smuggling) to a peripheral manifestation (possession); it also
shifts attention from an independent crime to a contrived offense.
This takes investigators even further away from core offenses that
2t. Other investigative techniques include traffic stops and airport searches.
22. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal
Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829,840 (2001).
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defendants commit independently of the government. The threat im-
plicit in possession offenses is already once removed from the harm-
fulness of drug trafficking. The threat implicit in contrived possession
is even more remote from that harm than the threat implicit in ordi-
nary possession offenses, which are not stimulated or shaped by the
government. The ease of obtaining a conviction for contrived offenses
reinforces the tendency to target criminals rather than crimes and
predispositions rather than conduct.
IV. WHY ARE SHORTCUTS A PROBLEM FOR THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE?
The ease of proving contrived offenses instead of independent
crimes reduces prosecutors' incentives to use infiltration for the pur-
pose its advocates valorize: to gain inside knowledge of criminal or-
ganizations in order to prove independent crimes. None of our
existing controls on infiltration address the shortcut problem or even
recognize it as a concern. Currently, the primary constraints on covert
policing are internal law enforcement regulations; 3 codes of profes-
sional responsibility that limit prosecutors' contacts with represented
parties;24 the Sixth Amendment (which places some limits on under-
cover questioning of incarcerated defendants);5 and the prohibition
on entrapment. 6 The law also limits the extent to which undercover
agents may participate in crimes. 7 These boundaries are established
through internal law enforcement regulation and through limitations
23. See, e.g., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS (2002), at www.usdoj.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf.
24. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1992) (prohibiting attorney
contact with represented persons).
25. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) (undercover agent may not circumvent the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel by speaking to subject who has been charged with the crime
under investigation).
26. See supra note 3.
27. An agent may
violate the literal terms of certain penal statutes.... The issue is one of kind and de-
gree .... [A]t some point feigned participation in a crime bears such resemblance to
the crime itself that society cannot tolerate the conduct. No one doubts that they could
not work in an undercover role in the investigation of a juvenile rape gang and actually
participant in a rape. ... The question is how far may police and prosecutors go in en-
gaging in conduct that would otherwise be illegal?
2 G. ROBERT BLAKEY, TECHNIOUES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
ORGANIZED CRIME: MANUALS OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 41 n.217 (1980). Judge Friendly
noted "there is certainly a limit to allowing governmental involvement in crime. It would be
unthinkable, for example, to permit government agents to instigate robberies and beatings
merely to gather evidence to convict other members of a gang of hoodlums." United States v.
Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973).
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on the public authority defense (which ordinarily protects agents
from prosecution for the crimes they commit in their undercover ca-
pacity). 8 Together, these limitations address the selection of targets
and venues, the required threshold of suspicion, the inducements un-
dercover agents may offer, the pressures they may exert, and how far
agents (and informants) may participate in criminal acts. What re-
mains largely unregulated, however, is the temptation to use infiltra-
tion to set up a shortcut to conviction.
In order to address this concern, it is useful to point out how the
shortcut creates problems from the perspective of the rules of evi-
dence -specifically, by undermining best evidence principles.29 Many,
but not all, contrived offenses can be thought of as copies of inde-
pendent crimes.30 A contrived offense involves undercover agents
offering a target the opportunity to replicate independent crimes un-
der controlled circumstances, so that the government may witness the
offense. When the government substitutes proof of a contrived of-
fense for proof of an independent crime, it offers evidence of the copy
in place of the original. Prosecuting the copy violates best evidence
principles where the government could have proved the original, that
is, where the state could have used the contrived offense to corrobo-
28. 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 142(a) (1984). See, e.g., IOWA
CODE ANN. § 704.11 (2003):
A peace officer or person acting as an agent of or directed by any police agency who
participate in the commission of a crime by another person solely for the purpose of
gathering evidence leading to the prosecution of such other person shall not be guilty
of that crime or of the crime of solicitation.
See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05(l) (McKinney 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-4)1 (1995).
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "[c]riminal prohibitions do not generally apply to rea-
sonable enforcement actions by officers of the law," Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406
(1998), and has explicitly recognized undercover participation in unlawful activity as "a recog-
nized and permissible means of investigation," United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432
(1973); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-09 (1966). See also Baucom v. Martin, 677 F.2d
1346 (11 th Cir. 1982) (invoking Supremacy Clause immunity for FBI agent charged with bribing
a state prosecutor in an undercover operation).
29. Enshrined in Federal Rule of Evidence 1002 and better denominated as the "Original
Documents Rule," the Best Evidence Rule itself applies to documents, recordings, photographs,
movies, and videotape. FED. R. EVID. 1002. Though the rule establishes a preference for pres-
entation of the original artifact, Federal Rule of Evidence 1003 creates a presumption that
"duplicates" of the original shall be admissible, unless "a genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original" or "in the circumstances, it would be unfair to admit the duplicate
in lieu of the original." FED. R. EvID. 1003. Federal Rule of Evidence 1004 lists the circum-
stances in which the production of the original will be excused and "other evidence of the
contents" will be admissible. FED. R. EVID. 1004.
3(1. There may also be investigations in which the contrived offense does not resemble the
suspected crime. To imprison a cagey burglar, agents may offer him a drug transaction in order
to set up an easy-tl-prove contrived offense. I do not treat this sort of scenario in this Article.
Rather, I am focusing on contrived offenses that mimic independent crimes.
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rate evidence of the independent crime. In particular, allowing prose-
cutors to charge the defendant with the contrived offense permits
them to prove the proxy even in those circumstances when the gov-
ernment's evidence would have enabled it to prove the original."
As an illustration, consider Henry Jones, whose story began this
Article. Jones was a drug dealer who sold five kilograms of cocaine to
a government informant in a contrived offense. Instead of convicting
Jones for the contrived offense, that drug transaction could be used as
a way of corroborating the information about the independent nar-
cotics crimes that the government had collected through a wiretap.
Jones' use of code words during the transaction could help the gov-
ernment decrypt the previously intercepted telephone calls. Because
of the government's influence on the transaction, using evidence of it
to prove prior independent crimes is preferable to using the same
evidence to prosecute Jones for the contrived offense. Convicting
Jones of the contrived offense punishes him for what he is willing to
do under government prodding. But the state has the better option of
31. Challenging the claim that evidentiary rules serve primarily to control the jury, Dale
Nance has argued that many evidentiary rules can be understood as forcing litigants to present
better evidence-that is, more complete, well-founded, and reliable evidence. Dale A. Nance,
The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 227 (1988). But see Edward J. lmwinkelried,
Should the Courts Incorporate a Best Evidence Rule Into the Standard Determining the Admissi-
bility of Scientific Testimonv?: Enough is Enough Even When It Is Not the Best. 51) CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 19, 24 (1999j (questioning the role of best evidence principles in the Rules of
Evidence and arguing against the introduction of a "best evidence" rule as a criterion for
screening expert testimony). In response, see David L. Faigman et al., How Good is Good
Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. L. REV. 645, 654 (2000)
(disavowing any desire to introduce a "best evidence" rule into screening of expert testimony
but endorsing a "better evidence" principle according to which courts "may exclude proffereJ
evidence when other evidence of greater probative value is or should be available").
My concerns about using contrived offenses as shortcuts to conviction echo "better
evidence" concerns. I argue against allowing prosecutors to seek convictions for contrived
offenses when the government can avail itself of better ways of establishing that a target is
involved in criminal activities. To be sure, any attempt to address the shortcut I have identified
would require courts to impose new limits on prosecutors' freedom to choose the evidence they
wish to present. And though courts have generally been reluctant to interfere with litigants'
narrative control over the presentation of their case, the Supreme Court has shown some will-
ingness to enforce limits on that strategic prerogative, holding, for example, that one considera-
tion in deciding whether to admit probative but prejudicial evidence is the availability of non-
problematic evidence of equal probative value. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174
(1997) (finding reversible error where court admitted evidence disclosing the nature of a defen-
dant's prior felony conviction, though the conviction was relevant to the indictment charging
him with being a felon in possession of a firearm, because defendant had offered to stipulate
that he had been previously convicted of an unspecified felony). Michael Risinger has argued
that courts should more readily exclude probative evidence when other (less prejudicial) evi-
dence is available, for example, by excluding what he calls "heartstrings and gore" evidence
whenever defendants offer to admit the facts which the evidence is offered to prove. D. Michael
Risinger, John Henri, Wigmore, Johnnv Lynn Old Chief and "Legitimate Moral Force"-
Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 406-08 (1998).
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pursuing him for what he does independently. The best measure of
how dangerous Jones is to society is what Jones does without gov-
ernment influence.
Prosecuting the contrived offense should be considered second-
best to proving the independent crime: first, because it is a proxy; and
second, because the infiltration provides only limited information
about what the target does independently of the investigator. When
the prosecution proves the contrived offense in its own right, the gov-
ernment shows what the target was willing to do when the state of-
fered him a criminal opportunity. When the government instead uses
the contrived offense to corroborate other evidence of independent
crimes, it proves not only what the target was willing to do but what
he actually did independently of the government. This reveals more
about the world as it exists unaffected by the influence of the investi-
gator. At the same time, using the contrived offense to prove the in-
dependent crime corrects for the infiltrator's influence, which
invariably distorts the accuracy of the contrived offense in represent-
ing the original, independent crime. In proving the independent
crime, the government will inevitably juxtapose the contrived sce-
nario against evidence of the target's independent criminal doings.
This will tend to expose those features of the contrived offense that
result from the infiltrator's influence.
I do not mean to suggest that the government may not engage in
sting operations, or that it may never prosecute the contrived offense
in its own right. Rather, I wish to argue that prosecuting the contrived
offense is second best to using the contrived offense as evidence of
the independent crime.32 Using the contrived offense to corroborate
32. In Richard Uviller's terminology, infiltration yields "trace evidence" of contrived
offenses but may yield only "predictive evidence" of independent crimes. H. Richard Uviller,
Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 845, 847-48 (1982). Trace evidence includes any evidence created by the crime
itself-for example, eyewitness testimony, bullet holes, hair samples, and the like. By contrast,
proof of other bad acts under Rule 404(b), proof of motive and opportunity, and negative char-
acter evidence are forms of "predictive evidence" that a given defendant would be likely to
commit a given crime. (Predictive evidence might be better called "probabilistic evidence,"
since it not only increases the probability that someone may commit a crime in the future, but
also makes it more likely that he committed such a crime in the past.) Evidence about a target's
dealings with undercover agents is trace evidence of the crimes he commits with their aid, but is
only predictive (probabilistic) evidence of his past participation in independent crimes. To be
sure, infiltration may also yield trace evidence of independent crimes, if the target makes some
reference to past offenses when speaking to informants or undercover agents. But if the gov-
ernment can prove contrived offenses in place of independent crimes, it has less reason to seek
out such trace evidence. Trace evidence, however, is more direct proof of a crime. For a recent
critique reviving the distinction and cautioning against over-reliance on predictive evidence, see
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other evidence of the independent crime has the advantage of proving
the original in lieu of the copy while exposing the distortions intro-
duced by the government. Consider again Cynthia Smith, who smug-
gled fifty grams of crack into prison at the suggestion of a government
informant. Suppose this contrived offense were used to corroborate
other evidence that she had previously smuggled small quantities of
marijuana into prison (the independent crime). Then, the jury could
use the evidence of the contrived offense to conclude that Smith has
previous experience in smuggling narcotics into prison, that she knew
how to do so, and that she had previously provided drugs to Edna
Baines. At the same time, admitting the contrived offense only as
evidence of independent crimes would prevent the government from
greatly increasing Smith's sentence by inducing her to deal in crack
instead of marijuana (her usual product). If investigators come to use
infiltration to corroborate independent crimes, police and prosecutors
would have every reason to minimize the distortions they introduce
into the target's decision-making environment. For the less a prof-
fered criminal opportunity resembles those that the target confronts
ordinarily, the less the contrived offense illuminates the independent
crimes that it is offered to prove.
One may ask why we need the rules of evidence to correct for the
distorting influence of undercover agents. The entrapment doctrine
seems designed to deal with this concern. Yet the entrapment defense
regulates this problem only incompletely. Only a limited subset of
distortions counts as entrapment. The defense remedies only extreme
situations, which occur when informants and undercover agents exert
excessive pressure or offer inordinate inducements -investigations in
which the government's tactics "implant the criminal design" in oth-
erwise law-abiding persons.33 The entrapment defense does not cor-
rect for less distorting influences on the target-that is, for the
intervention inherent in using undercover tactics. Unless the under-
cover agent used tactics that overbore the target's will, or that would
have overborne the will of a hypothetical law-abiding person, the
entrapment defense does not distinguish contrived offenses from in-
dependent crimes. 34
Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1227, 1234-39 (2001).




To use the rules of evidence to regulate infiltration would rem-
edy a blind spot of the entrapment doctrine. The entrapment doctrine
asks only whether the evidence supports a conviction for the
contrived offense. It does not inquire whether the independent crime
is best proved by proxy, that is, by prosecuting the target for a con-
trived offense. Once courts recognize that the contrived offense is a
proxy, and an imperfect one at that, best evidence principles dictate a
preference for the original (independent crime) over its replica. The
rules of evidence thus offer a way to constrain the too common temp-
tation to prove the contrived offense in place of the independent
crime.
V. A REFORM PROPOSAL
How can the rules of evidence counteract the temptation to use
undercover operatives to generate shortcuts? Here is a proposal.
Based on best evidence principles, legislatures should enact a new
rule of evidence limiting the purposes for which the government may
offer evidence of contrived offenses. The objective of the new rule
would be to limit the circumstances in which the government can
prove contrived offenses in their own right, as a substitute for inde-
pendent crimes. Whenever the government plans to prosecute a tar-
get for contrived offenses facilitated by government intervention,
prosecutors would first have to proffer evidence of any independent
crimes that the contrived offenses help to corroborate. The court
should then determine whether proof of the contrived offense suffi-
ciently corroborates evidence of an independent crime to support a
conviction for that independent crime. In making this determination,
the court should interpret the proffered evidence in the light most
favorable to the government. If the court concludes that the evidence
of the independent crime is too weak to permit a rational jury to con-
vict the defendant of that crime, it would allow the government to
prove the contrived offense in its own right. If, on the other hand, the
evidence of the contrived offense sufficiently corroborates evidence
of the independent crime to support a conviction, the court should
conditionally admit evidence of the contrived offense for the limited
purpose of proving the independent crime. (In effect, this would re-
quire the government to charge the independent crime if it wishes to
use the evidence it obtained in the undercover investigation of the
contrived offense.) In this way, the court would force the prosecution
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to put its evidence of the contrived offense to its best use: proving the
independent crime.
Suppose that a jury refused to convict a defendant of an inde-
pendent crime after hearing evidence of that crime plus evidence of a
contrived offense introduced to corroborate the independent crime.
Under these circumstances, the jury would be entitled to convict the
defendant of the contrived offense instead. The court would enforce
this policy through limiting instructions to the jury, directing them to
consider proof of the independent crimes first and to use evidence
obtained undercover to convict of the contrived offense only if they
acquit the defendant of all independent crimes that the contrived of-
fense tends to corroborate. 35 In this way, the jury would retain the
power to convict defendants of contrived offenses when such evi-
dence falls short of proving the independent crimes.
Under my proposal, how would courts decide whether to admit
evidence of independent crimes as "other acts" evidence under Rule
404(b)? At present, the government often seeks admission of inde-
35. Under my proposal, then, certain conditions must be met before evidence that was
obtained undercover may used to convict defendants of contrived offenses. The jury must first
acquit the defendant of independent crimes. But this proposal is not intended to resuscitate the
doctrine of conditional relevance, which has been widely criticized. See Ronald J. Allen, The
Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 871, 871-72 (1992); Vaughn C. Ball, The
Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REV. 435, 437-38 (1980). The reason for limiting the
purposes for which the government may admit evidence of contrived offenses is not that the
evidence is only conditionally relevant to the contrived offense. Evidence of contrived offenses
is directly relevant to the allegation that the defendant committed these offenses. The admissi-
bility of this evidence, unlike the admissibility of conditionally relevant evidence, does not
depend on the ability of the government to prove some predicate proposition. Rather, admissi-
bility depends on the government's inability to prove an allegation, that is, its inability to convict
the defendant of an independent crime. My proposal is closer in spirit to Dale Nance's argument
that some applications of the conditional relevance doctrine (which he would prefer to describe
as "a doctrine of 'conditional probative value"') can be defended as excluding relevant evidence
because "it is inexcusably incomplete standing alone"; that is, because the litigant inexcusably
failed "to collect, preserve, and present such evidence." Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance
Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REV. 447, 473, 474, 480 (1990). Richard Friedman offers a similar
reconstruction of the doctrine as a way of requiring litigants "to support ... proffered evidence
with appropriate predicate evidence." Richard D. Friedman, Conditional Probative Value:
Neoclassicism Without Myth, 93 MICH. L. REV. 439, 471 (1994). That is, I propose that courts
condition admission of evidence to prove contrived offenses in ways that will require prosecu-
tors, whenever possible, to present the best and most direct evidence of a target's independent
doings before resorting to the shortcut that permits them to convict the target of a contrived
proxy for that crime. For another proposal that would require litigants to present more direct
and complete evidence of a factual allegation, see David Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher
and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101, 104 (arguing that trial courts should direct a verdict
against a plaintiff who relies exclusively on evidence establishing background probabilities).
This proposal would place on plaintiffs the burden to acquire additional evidence that would
improve the accuracy of fact-finding. For a discussion of this proposal, see Richard Lempert,
The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, in PROBABILITY AND
INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 61, 71 (Peter Tillers & Eric D. Green eds., 1988).
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pendent crimes as "other acts" establishing modus operandi, absence
of mistake or accident, or some other aspect of the contrived offense.
In particular, if a defendant raises the entrapment defense, the gov-
ernment may offer proof of the independent crimes to establish the
defendant's predisposition to commit the contrived offense.36 Under
my proposal, if the government seeks to admit evidence of independ-
ent crimes under Rule 404(b), the court will have to make two linked
decisions. First, it will have to decide whether to allow the govern-
ment to prove the contrived offense in its own right. If the court con-
cludes that the evidence of independent crimes is too weak to support
a conviction for those crimes by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the
court will permit prosecutors to pursue a conviction for contrived
offenses instead. In that case, the court will face a second decision.
Should it admit evidence of independent crimes as "other acts" help-
ing to prove the contrived offense? Should the court allow prosecu-
tors to use that evidence to establish, for example, that a defendant
claiming entrapment was predisposed to commit the contrived of-
fense? Since Rule 404(b) applies only a preponderance standard to
the "other acts" evidence, a court may well permit the government to
use the independent crimes as 404(b) evidence, even if it harbors
enough doubt about the independent crimes to permit the govern-
ment to go forward with its prosecution for contrived offenses.
Alternatively, a court reviewing a motion to admit evidence of
independent crimes under Rule 404(b) might find the evidence suffi-
ciently compelling to conclude that the government has no need to
prove the contrived offense in its own right. In that case, the con-
trived offense may itself become "other acts" evidence under Rule
404(b), depending on the degree to which evidence of the contrived
offense corroborates proof of the independent crimes. In other words,
courts will have the option of reversing the direction of inference:
instead of admitting independent crimes to help prove contrived of-
fenses, they might admit contrived offenses to prove the independent
crimes.
37
36. United States v. Coleman, 284 F.3d 892, 894 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Van Horn,
277 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2002).
37. Notice that it may be harder to admit evidence of contrived offenses to prove inde-
pendent crimes than vice versa. Predisposition will not be at issue when the government is
offering its evidence of contrived offenses to prove independent crimes, for there is no entrap-
ment defense to such charges. Rule 404(b) will bar the government from using evidence of
contrived offenses to prove an offender's propensity; instead, Rule 404(b) will admit such evi-
dence only when it tends to establish some feature of the contrived offense, such as motive,
opportunity, absence of mistake or accident, or modus operandi, subject to an assessment of
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Reversing the direction of inference would force the government
to charge the independent offenses along with the contrived offense.
That the contrived crime is easier to prove should not permit the
government to dispense with proof of independent crimes, if the court
concludes that the evidence reasonably obtainable by the government
supports a conviction for the independent crimes. Limiting instruc-
tions would direct the fact-finder to the preferred use of contrived
offenses-namely as corroborating evidence of independent crimes.
Consider how this proposal applies to the two operations de-
scribed at the beginning of this Article. Evidence from Henry Jones'
five-kilogram "buy-bust" (the contrived offense) could have assisted
the government in building a case against him for the narcotics crimes
he committed without government assistance. In the same way, evi-
dence that Cynthia Smith smuggled crack into prison (the contrived
offense) could have been used to corroborate witness testimony, tele-
phone records, and Smith's own confession concerning her previous
narcotics smuggling (the independent crimes). Unlike the contrived
offenses, the independent crimes were never contaminated by gov-
ernment influence. The reform proposal would privilege proof of
these independent crimes.
Perhaps the most troubling implication of this reform proposal is
that it sometimes forces courts to reject evidence of a charged (con-
trived) offense, directing the jury instead to consider the evidence as
proof of a different (independent) crime, which the prosecutor would
have elected not to charge. If evidence tends to prove a charged of-
fense, its potential relevance to an uncharged crime would not nor-
mally prevent the jury from considering it as proof of the charged
offense. Why prevent evidence of the contrived offense from estab-
lishing that crime? Why force the prosecutor to use the evidence for
another, much less direct purpose-proof of the independent crime?
Why require the prosecutor to bring charges that she chose to forego?
The justification for redirecting the use of evidence in this way
comes from viewing the prosecution of contrived offenses as a some-
times unnecessary substitute for proof of independent crimes. Con-
trived offenses and independent crimes should be viewed as
alternatives. Since contrived offenses are often copies of independent
crimes, where the government can prove the original, it should. Prov-
prejudice. FED. R. EVID. 404. To bear on these issues in any meaningful way, the contrived
offenses must be fairly similar to the independent crimes. United States v. Blankenship, 775
F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1985).
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ing an independent crime makes it unnecessary to prosecute the
proxy (i.e., the contrived offense). Accordingly, whenever possible
the government should prove the contrived offense as a means of
convicting upon the independent crime, not as an end in itself.
My proposal seems to have a counterintuitive consequence. Sup-
pose that Cynthia Smith's friend Betty Roberts was also a prison
guard. Roberts, like Smith, smuggled fifty grams of crack into prison.
Both Roberts and Smith obtained the crack from a government in-
formant. But assume that the government has insufficient evidence to
convict Roberts of smuggling drugs into prison on any prior occa-
sions. Smith seems to deserve more punishment than Roberts, since
she has probably committed previous crimes. Yet under my proposal,
Smith faces conviction for small-scale marijuana crimes, while Betty
faces conviction for the much more serious crack offense. One might
defend this result by treating Smith's prior offenses as exculpatory
evidence with respect to the more serious crime. Smith's record of
smuggling only small amounts of marijuana into prison suggests that
Smith would likely not have sold fifty grams of crack had the govern-
ment not intervened. This extenuating argument is not available to
Roberts, absent evidence that she too dealt in smaller quantities of
lesser narcotics. In Roberts' case, the contrived offense must substi-
tute for the independent crime; what Roberts was willing to do for an
informant is the best evidence of what she did on her own.
But it does seem that my proposal would give the government a
reason to avoid investigating Smith's prior, independent crimes. Any
evidence the police gather of prior lesser offenses might undermine
the government's ability to prosecute Smith for the more serious con-
trived offense. In order to redirect investigative focus to independent
crimes, it will be necessary to supplement my proposal. Whenever the
government shapes a criminal plan, for example, by suggesting the
type or amount of drugs, the government should have to prove that
the target was predisposed to traffic in such narcotics.3" When the
38. At present, a defendant who claims that she was predisposed to commit a less serious
crime must raise this defense at sentencing, and must bear the burden of proving it by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. United States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1995). Courts are
divided in their willingness to recognize a defense of "sentencing entrapment" in their construc-
tion of the doctrine. Some courts that recognize the defense and employ it to reduce a defen-
dant's sentence will do so only if the government violated Due Process by engaging in
"outrageous official conduct." United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116, 1128 (9th Cir. 2003). Some
courts do not require a constitutional violation. United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096. 1100 (8th
Cir. 2000) (government conduct does not have to be outrageous to support claim of sentencing
entrapment). Yet others require a showing that unrelenting government pressure overbore the
[Vol 79:1111
VALUING INSIDE KNOWLEDGE
government participates in the crimes it investigates, it necessarily
influences the course of events to some extent, regardless of whether
its intervention rose to the level of entrapment. Inevitably, therefore,
infiltration raises a question about whether the defendant would have
committed a comparable offense on his own. To ensure that under-
cover tactics do not create the crimes that they purport to expose,
courts should require the prosecution to establish that the contrived
offense reliably reflects what the defendant would have done without
government influence. To make this showing, the government must
correct for its intervention. And to correct for its intervention, the
government must offer evidence of predisposition.
Requiring the government to prove that a defendant was predis-
posed to commit the contrived offense would have two salutary con-
sequences. First, it would give the police a reason to investigate
independent crimes since these might provide evidence of predisposi-
tion to commit contrived offenses. Presenting evidence of the inde-
pendent crime thus enhances the government's chances of convicting
the defendant of the contrived offense, should the jury fail to convict
on the independent crimes. (A jury might acquit the defendant of
defendant's will. United States v. Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2002). Others
apply the defense only to unspecified "egregious cases." United States v. Bara, 13 F.3d 1418,
1420 (10th Cir. 1994). And others have rejected the defense entirely. United States v. Miller, 71
F.3d 813, 817 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329-30 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines have recognized a limited form of the entrapment defense in
drug cases, providing that,
"if... [a] defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide, or was not
reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance.
the court shall exclude from the offense level determination the amount of the con-
trolled substance that the defendant establishes he or she did not intend to provide or
was not reasonably capable of providing.
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.l app. n.12. Further,
the Sentencing Guidelines provide that a downward departure may be warranted where price
manipulation by the government in a reverse sting operation allows a defendant to purchase a
significantly greater quantity than his resources would allow at market rates. Id. at app. n.14.
Defendants who were capable of supplying a greater quantity of drugs but would not ordinarily
have done so will not benefit from this provision, since they will not be able to show that they
were not "reasonably capable" of supplying the negotiated amount. Nor will defendants be able
to establish sentencing entrapment by establishing that "but for the request and assistance of the
government and its informant," they would not have been capable of supplying the agreed-upon
drug. United States v. Hinds, 329 F.3d 184.188 (D.C. Cir. 2003). And again, the defendant bears
the burden of proof on these claims; mere deviance from the scope of his usual operations will
not suffice to reduce his sentence for contrived offenses, absent evidence of fairly egregious
government manipulation. Even then, at least one court has rejected a defense of "sentencing
manipulation" -the claim that the government has improperly manipulated the defendant for
the sole purpose of increasing his sentence -distinguishing this from "sentencing entrapment,"
which it defined as the claim that the government has improperly enticed him to commit an
offense different from the one he was predisposed to commit. United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d
74, 75-76 (7th Cir. 1996).
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independent crimes and convict him of contrived offenses if there is
sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant had previously com-
mitted similar crimes but not sufficient evidence to identify the prior
occurrence.)
Second, requiring the government to prove predisposition (e.g.,
as to drug type and quantity) may lead covert agents to influence
criminal opportunities in ways that better approximate the normal
activities of the target.39 If the prosecution lacked evidence of inde-
pendent crimes, the government would have to make sure that it was
the target, not the undercover agent, who suggested the basic parame-
ters of the contrived criminal transaction. The less the government
influenced the transaction-the less it suggested-the less evidence it
would need to show predisposition.
Limiting the evidentiary uses of contrived offenses also accords
with the role that evidentiary rules play in shaping investigative
methods. The rules of evidence do not just validate evidence. They
influence investigative methods by determining what sort of informa-
tion counts as "evidence" at trial. Suppression remedies for illegally
obtained evidence are designed to influence investigative methods by
giving investigators reasons to respect constitutional limitations on
searches, seizures, and police interrogations. Likewise, hearsay rules,
authentication requirements, and the best evidence rule itself all af-
fect investigators' decisions on which documents to obtain and which
witnesses to interview. Limiting the evidentiary uses of undercover
tactics at trial can counteract the temptation to investigate contrived
offenses in lieu of independent crimes. Evidentiary limitations on
proving contrived offenses can give the government a powerful incen-
tive to investigate and charge the independent crimes that motivate
the use of undercover tactics in the first place.
Here is an objection to my proposal. Undercover policing is not
the only investigative technique that influences criminal conduct.
Witness interviews, grand jury subpoenas, and other conventional
methods of inquiry may also trigger criminal activity, including lies to
investigators, efforts to destroy evidence, and threats to witnesses. As
with contrived offenses, these crimes are a product of the govern-
ment's investigation. But for the government's efforts to investigate
39. Undercover agents will have little reason to request inordinate drug amounts if they
must use evidence of independent crimes to prove predisposition. If the target's normal narcot-
ics business involved lesser quantities than those the police purchase undercover, the indcpend-
ent crimes will negate the target's predisposition to sell the larger amount.
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an underlying, independent offense, the targets would not have
threatened witnesses, destroyed evidence, and engaged in other ef-
forts to obstruct. As with contrived offenses, the government may
choose to charge targets with obstruction of justice when the penalties
for doing so exceed the sanctions for the crimes the government was
investigating, or when the crimes they investigated are too costly and
difficult to pursue. Should courts therefore bar prosecutors from
charging defendants with obstruction? Should they allow the evidence
of obstruction to be admitted only for the purpose of proving the de-
fendant's participation in the underlying offense'? Should the gov-
ernment's right to pursue obstruction charges depend on their
inability to prove the underlying, independent crime?
The answer to these questions, I contend, is "no." Destroying
documents or threatening witnesses does not replicate the crimes that
the government is investigating. In proving up the obstruction, the
government does not implicitly represent the offense as a copy or
proxy for what the defendant does when the government is not pre-
sent to observe. The obstruction offense is different in nature. It
therefore deserves its own punishment. Nor can the government be
said to engineer the offense as it does when it purchases drugs under-
cover. The primary function of conventional investigative techniques
is to gather evidence of a suspected crime, not to stimulate new of-
fenses. The government does not investigate a crime in order to gen-
erate obstruction offenses. Investigating a crime through conventional
methods does not inherently tempt the government to prove up a
different (contrived) offense as a shortcut to conviction. By contrast,
whenever an undercover operation offers the target the opportunity
to repeat a suspected crime in full view of the undercover agent,
stimulating a new offense is essential to the success of the investiga-
tion. Covert agents inevitably confront a temptation to shift the focus
of inquiry from the independent crime to the proxy contrived by the
government. Fighting the temptation to generate shortcuts is there-
fore essential to constraining undercover operations. In a conven-
tional investigation, there is little ability to "generate" obstruction
charges.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF MY REFORM PROPOSAL FOR INSTITUTIONAL
ACTORS, PLEA BARGAINING, AND PUNISHMENT
Limiting what prosecutors can prove will constrain what crimes
they charge and how they investigate cases. Does this proposal in-
2OO41
CHICAGO-KENT LA IV REVIEW
volve the judiciary too deeply in the executive sphere? No-given
that rules of evidence already affect the ways in which prosecutors
gather information and the sorts of information they pursue. The
rules of evidence have the effect of limiting what parties can prove
and how-for example, when the rules limit a witness's testimony to
statements based on personal knowledge, or when the rules prefer
tapes to transcripts, or direct testimony to hearsay." Even if the gov-
ernment's evidence tends to prove some relevant allegation, a court
can demand better evidence, where that is obtainable. A court can
require, for example, an original document when the government
tenders some other proof of its contents; or it can bar the government
from introducing a declarant's former testimony when she is available
to testify at trial.4t By determining what counts as evidence and by
regulating permissible inferences, the rules of evidence inevitably
influence investigators' tactics and the charges they choose to pursue.
What matters in assessing new evidentiary limits is whether the result-
ing burdens on litigants serve some valid purpose. Limiting the uses
of infiltration serves such a purpose. It promotes efforts to discover
what a target does independently of the government's influence.
What a target does on her own is a better indicator of what punish-
ment she deserves than what she may be prompted to do by investiga-
tors.
But even if my proposal serves a valid purpose, it must be
workable in the real world. Is it? How well can it be administered
within the adversarial context of litigation? The rest of this Section
will explore how my proposal would affect the division of labor be-
tween prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel, and how it would
alter the dynamics of plea-bargaining and the sentencing process.
40. Dale Nance has suggested interpreting the missing evidence rule in ways that heighten
investigative burdens on prosecutors. Under his proposal, courts would often have to consider
whether the prosecutor might have pursued better evidence before ruling on the inferences that
the jury will be permitted to draw from those bits of evidence that the government chooses to
present. Dale A. Nance, Missing Evidence, 13 CARDoZO L. REV. 831, 847-49 (1991); see also,
Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 621
(1998) (arguing that "the burden of proof should reflect the need to avoid rendering a judgment
on the basis of an evidentiary package that is unreasonably incomplete, completeness being
measured relative to the total package of evidence that is (or should have been) reasonably
available to the tribunal").
41. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); see White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354 (1992). Invoking
defendants' Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, John Douglass argues that even when
hearsay evidence is admitted, the government should be required to produce available decla-
rants for cross-examination. John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation,




To begin with, my proposal would change interactions between
prosecutors, investigators, judges, and the defense. A preference for
using contrived offenses to prove independent crimes would encour-
age prosecutors and agents to shape contrived offenses in ways that
illuminate independent crimes. At present, since prosecutors can pun-
ish targets for contrived offenses, they are tempted to use infiltration
in place of more conventional investigative tactics. Once prosecutors
had to prove independent crimes, they would supplement infiltration
with other investigative techniques. If infiltration served mainly to
corroborate other evidence, and if prosecutors had to explore inde-
pendent crimes to prove predisposition, investigators would seek out
direct evidence of such crimes from witnesses, financial records, and
wiretaps. This shift would encourage closer cooperation between
prosecutors and the police in the early formative stages of criminal
investigations. Such contacts are already commonplace in investiga-
tions that require judicial approval of search warrants or wiretaps.42
But many types of undercover operations currently occur without any
or with only minimal prosecutorial oversight.43
My proposal would also require courts to scrutinize prosecutorial
charging decisions in new and unfamiliar ways. Judges would need to
enforce new limits on prosecutorial discretion by evaluating evidence
of crimes the government has chosen not to charge and, in effect, sec-
ond-guess that decision. In addition, prosecutors and agents would
have to open their investigative files in ways that might compromise
confidential sources. For how could judges otherwise assess the
strength of the government's evidence? These new burdens, while
troubling, are not fatal to my proposal. Where there are valid con-
cerns about protecting the identity of informants, courts can examine
investigative records in camera, as they already do, such as in evaluat-
ing defense allegations of improprieties in grand jury proceedings.14
The monitoring function that I propose to assign to the judiciary
is not without precedent in other contexts. Judges routinely weigh the
42. For an account of the interdependence between prosecutors and agents as members of
a mutually monitoring "working group," see Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and their Agents,
Agents and their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 749 (2003). Requiring prosecutors to
consider contrived offenses as evidence of independent crimes would increase the interdepend-
ence of prosecutors and agents and might well enhance their incentives to monitor each other's
performance and keep each other in check.
43. See id. at 758-59 for the argument that police officers and federal agents turn to prose-
cutors mainly when they engage in investigative conduct requiring judicial authorization, includ-
ing the issuance of subpoenas. wiretap orders, search warrants, and the like.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 1997).
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strength of the prosecution's evidence in deciding whether to allow
the government to offer coconspirator statements under the cocon-
spirator exception to the hearsay rule, 45 or whether to admit "other
act" evidence under Rule 404(b).46 In deciding whether to accept co-
conspirator testimony, judges must weigh evidence that a conspiracy
existed, even where that conspiracy is not charged. 47 In assessing the
strength of the government's "other acts" evidence, courts necessarily
evaluate crimes that the government has never charged.41 Currently
judges only weigh the strength of the government's evidence when
the government wants to admit evidence of uncharged crimes. Under
my proposal, judges would have to evaluate evidence of uncharged,
independent crimes, even when the government does not seek to
prove them at trial.
Judges' review of prosecutors' investigative and charging deci-
sions will be complicated by the incentives that motivate prosecutors
and the constraints that confront defense counsel. A judge may find it
difficult to second-guess a prosecutor's claim that the evidence of
independent crimes is too weak to support a conviction, particularly
since the government controls the evidence and the way in which it is
presented. Prosecutors could underplay the strength of such evidence
if they wish to convict on a contrived offense instead-perhaps be-
cause the contrived offense is easier to prove, or carries heavier pen-
alties. If the defendant wishes to avoid higher penalties for a
contrived offense, defense counsel might argue that the evidence of
independent crimes is sufficiently strong to support a conviction. But
such claims may be difficult to support, given that prosecutors' con-
trol of the evidence puts them in a better position to characterize
their proffer to the judge.
By what standard should the judge evaluate the government's
proffer of evidence establishing the defendant's commission of an
independent crime? I advocate that the judge use "the light most fa-
vorable to the government." That is the standard that courts ordinar-
ily use in evaluating a prosecutor's proffer of evidence when she
moves, say, for admission of coconspirator statements. 49 But how, in
45. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E); see Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,177 (1987).
46. Such determinations are usually made in advance of trial, through rulings on motions in
lirnine.
47. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 886 n.41 (5th Cir. 1979).
48. Rule 404(b) explicitly requires judges to weigh the evidence of the prior bad act. FED.
R. EVID. 404.
49. See supra note 45.
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practice, should the court apply that standard when the party who
controls the evidence-the government-has no reason to advocate
its admission? What does it mean to evaluate evidence "in the light
most favorable" to the government when the prosecutor has no
reason to present the evidence of independent crimes in a favorable
light? Since prosecutors may underplay the evidence, any admissibil-
ity standard that defers to their characterization of the record would
make judicial oversight ineffective as a device for requiring the gov-
ernment, whenever possible, to prove independent crimes instead of
contrived offenses. Interpreting evidence of independent crimes in a
favorable light must therefore mean assessing it in the light most fa-
vorable to admission, not in the light most favorable to the govern-
ment's position-which may be hostile to admission.
One way of making it easier for judges to evaluate the govern-
ment's evidence of independent crimes is to give prosecutors a reason
to champion proof of independent crimes. My proposal does so by
refusing to allow prosecutors to prove a contrived offense unless they
first show that the target was predisposed to commit the offense. How
does one prove predisposition? One way is by showing a prior history
of similar criminal transactions-in other words, by demonstrating
the independent crimes that motivated the undercover operation in
the first place. At present, the government only needs to prove pre-
disposition when a target raises the entrapment defense and carries
an initial burden of production by offering some evidence of over-
bearing tactics. 50 Thus, predisposition currently matters only in those
cases where defendants have some grounds to claim that they were
entrapped. Under my proposal, the government would have to estab-
lish predisposition whenever it seeks to prosecute a contrived offense
in place of an independent crime. This requirement would correct for
the inevitable influence of the infiltrator on the crimes she investi-
gates. The government would have to establish predisposition, not
just generally, but with respect to every aggravating feature of the
50. United States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2003) (requiring defendant to
present evidence not only of unusual government inducement, but also of her own lack of pre-
disposition); United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245, 1260-61 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same); United
States v. King, 73 F.3d 1564, 1568 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (defendant bears initial burden of production
on entrapment defense); United States v. Busby, 780 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1986) (same);
United States v. Branca, 677 F.2d 59, 61 (1lth Cir. 1982) (same). Some state courts require
defendants to bear the burden of proof as well. State v. Hammeren, 655 N.W.2d 707, 709 (N.D.
2003); State v. Casey, 71 P.3d 351, 355 (Ariz. 2003); Taylor v. State, 777 A.2d 759, 765-77 (Del.
2001); State v. Branham. 569 S.E.2d 24, 29 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Miyashiro, 979 P.2d 85,
91-92 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Chatman, 599 So. 2d 335, 347 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
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offense (such as drug type and quantity).51 Requiring the state to
prove predisposition should counteract the temptation for prosecu-
tors to downplay evidence of independent crimes whenever they
would prefer to prosecute contrived offenses instead. In order to
show that a defendant was predisposed to commit contrived offenses,
prosecutors will have to investigate independent crimes and to argue
the strength of that evidence in their submission to the court.
If the court concludes that the evidence of an independent crime
is strong enough to support a conviction, the jury will have the oppor-
tunity to convict the defendant of the contrived offense only if it first
decides to acquit the defendant of the independent crime. Suppose a
jury refuses to convict a defendant of an independent crime. It may
nonetheless conclude that the government's evidence is strong
enough to establish predisposition with respect to the contrived of-
fense. That is, the jury will have the opportunity to consider the evi-
dence of independent crimes as "other acts" evidence only after it has
decided that the evidence is not strong enough to support a convic-
tion for those crimes in their own right. When would a jury find there
to be sufficient evidence of predisposition to convict the defendant of
the contrived offense, but insufficient evidence to convict him of the
independent crimes? The jury may conclude that there is enough evi-
dence to find that the defendant had committed similar offenses in
the past, even if it cannot determine with certainty which prior of-
fenses the defendant committed. Requiring the government to prove
predisposition-and with respect to every aggravating feature of the
offense-will not only have the salutary effect of requiring the gov-
ernment to expose and correct for the distortions inherent in the use
of infiltration. It will also give prosecutors a reason to investigate in-
dependent crimes. It will give them an incentive to argue for admis-
51. My proposal thus makes it more difficult to establish predisposition. Under the current
standard for evaluating claims of entrapment, prosecutors can prevail by establishing a general
predisposition to commit crimes like those charged, even if the government offers an opportu-
nity that significantly escalates the target's ordinary criminal activities, for example, by convinc-
ing a marijuana dealer to sell cocaine instead. The government need not prove that the
defendant was predisposed to deal in the particular type of drug charged. United States v.
Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 n.6 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 944 (3d
Cir. 1986); United States v. Navar, 611 F.2d 1156, 1158 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting proof of defen-
dant's "predisposition to sell drugs" generally). Indeed, the defendant can be convicted without
proof that he knew what type of drug he was handling, so long as the government establishes
that he knew he was dealing with a controlled substance. United States v. Lewis, 676 F.2d 508,
512 (l1th Cir. 1982); United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 698 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Zapata, 497 F.2d 95,
97-98 (5th Cir. 1974).
[Vol 79:1111l
VALUING INSIDE KNOWLEDGE
sion of evidence proving such crimes. And it will encourage them to
design contrived offenses in ways that closely approximate the set-
tings in which targets conduct their independent crimes. For the more
the contrived offense resembles the independent crimes, the more
likely that evidence of the contrived offense will be admissible under
Rule 404(b) to prove modus operandi, absence of mistake or acci-
dent, and the like.
My proposal must take into account not only the interests of
prosecutors. It must also counteract defendants' incentives to invite
prosecution for lesser independent crimes as a way of avoiding
harsher penalties for more serious contrived offenses. What happens
if the defendant "confesses" to the independent crime? If the court
views that admission in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
would that automatically establish that the evidence of the crime is
strong enough to convict? If so, a defendant who wishes to avoid pun-
ishment for a contrived offense can always "confess" to a less serious
independent crime, forcing the government to charge the independ-
ent crime if it wishes to present evidence of the contrived offense.
Once the government charges the independent crime, the defendant
can plead guilty to that charge, thereby insulating herself from prose-
cution for the contrived offense. In evaluating evidence of independ-
ent crimes, the judge may find herself in the odd position of assessing
a defense claim that the evidence of independent crime is sufficiently
strong to support a conviction, while the government will have every
reason to underplay the weight of the evidence. At trial, of course,
the defense and the prosecution will have to make the opposite ar-
guments (unless the defendant pleads guilty to the independent
crime).
Courts would also have to exclude self-serving "confessions" in
assessing the evidence of independent crimes. Given the incentive for
defendants to "admit" to less serious independent crimes, courts
should not allow defendants to use a plea to a lesser charge as an ex-
pedient for avoiding conviction on a more serious contrived offense.
After all, courts would not allow a defendant to plead guilty to man-
slaughter against the wishes of a prosecutor who was pursuing a mur-
der charge52 Courts should only allow defendants to plead to
independent crimes if the government's proffer convinced the court
that, even without the confession, there was sufficient evidence to
52. The defendant would retain the option of testifying at trial that she lacked predisposi-
tion to commit the more serious contrived offense.
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support a conviction for the independent crime. To be sure, a guilty
plea to the independent crime would prevent the government from
prosecuting the defendant for the contrived offense. But if it were
reliably established that the defendant committed the independent
crime, there would be no more need to convict him of the contrived
offense that serves as a substitute.
How would my proposal affect guilty pleas to contrived offenses?
After all, most criminal cases do not go to trial. How easily could
prosecutors avoid the impact of evidentiary constraints by negotiating
pleas to contrived offenses? That would depend on judicial willing-
ness to require complete information from prosecutors about their
investigation of a target before accepting a guilty plea to a contrived
offense. The court's aim would be to reject pleas to contrived offenses
whenever the government's evidence would have strongly corrobo-
rated evidence of independent crimes. And where proof of the inde-
pendent crimes is possible, defendants would have little reason to
plead to more serious contrived offenses, which carry higher penal-
ties.
The effectiveness of this reform proposal would also depend on
what happens at sentencing. Suppose the jury convicts Cynthia Smith
of the marijuana offenses and acquits her of the (contrived) crack
offense. Under present sentencing systems, the sentencing judge
would include the fifty grams of crack in calculating the drug quantity
that dictates her sentence. Though Smith would not be subject to a
statutory minimum term, the contrived offense would still increase
her sentence substantially.53 The current sentencing system rewards
distortions introduced by the government. Accordingly, my eviden-
tiary reform must also entail a sentencing reform: unless the judge or
jury convicts a defendant of a contrived offense, that crime may not
increase punishment at sentencing. Nor should the judge increase
punishment for the contrived offense if she concludes by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendant committed the independ-
ent crimes. The contrived and independent crimes provide alternative
measures of the same harm.
53. In the federal system, her sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines would closely




VII.BEYOND SHORTCUTS: OTHER EVIDENTIARY TEMPTATIONS OF
UNDERCOVER POLICING
My proposal does not pertain to every kind of infiltration. It ad-
dresses those forms of infiltration in which the police contrive of-
fenses that substitute for hard-to-prove independent crimes. But not
all contrived offenses are proxies for some other crime. Undercover
police who infiltrate a drug-trafficking organization may learn of
plans to murder a rival and offer themselves as accomplices to un-
mask the scheme. Agents may pose as arsonists to investigate targets
who want to burn down their businesses for insurance proceeds. In-
formants investigating a series of small-scale terrorist attacks may
learn that their targets are planning a much larger operation. These
scenarios resemble contrived offenses in the sense that the infiltrator
inevitably influences the course of events by his participation. But in
all of these instances, the crimes in which the government intervenes
merit inquiry in their own right. This use of infiltration is more than a
shortcut that creates a contrived offense in place of a hard-to-prove
independent crime. The government should be able to prosecute
these offenses without having to establish its inability to prove some
other crime.
But these sorts of undercover operations also tempt investigators
with shortcuts, though shortcuts of a somewhat different kind than I
have so far discussed. Charging contrived crimes rather than inde-
pendent crimes is essentially a shortcut employed by prosecutors.
Now I would like to consider shortcuts specific to undercover agents.
Instead of simply positioning themselves to observe their targets in
action, agents and informants may choose to help matters along-to
facilitate proof-by taking an active part in planning and carrying out
the crimes they investigate. This may make it easier for them to
obtain information and to prevent harm to their targets' intended
victims. Yet when pressed too far, overly intrusive undercover work
blurs as much as it reveals. When an agent assumes too active a role
in shaping a target's criminal plans, the government may learn less
than it hoped about the firmness of a target's plans and her ability to
carry them out. Consider, for example, the undercover agent in her
role as deep-cover mole. To create easily provable evidence, the mole
may supply her targets with essential tools and know-how and even
carry out key parts of offenses herself. Undercover agents have car-
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ried out burglaries, 54 set up drug labs,55 and printed counterfeit
currency, 6 all in the name of "exposing" the crimes they facilitate. Or
consider the agent pretending to be a hired killer or arsonist. She may
assist too much in planning, arranging alibis, disabling alarms, open-
ing safes, supplying essential tools, helping with the financing, and so
forth. The more actively the agent shapes an inchoate criminal plan,
the less she puts her target to the test-and the less she learns about
what the target would have and could have done on his own.
The rules of evidence should play a role in regulating these kinds
of undercover agent shortcuts as well as the prosecutor shortcuts that
I earlier described. In particular, the rules can encourage the govern-
ment to put infiltration to its best use as a device for gathering inside
knowledge of its targets' plans. Evidentiary rules should give investi-
gators incentives to minimize their intervention and thereby maxi-
mize knowledge about what their targets intended, how they intended
to do it, and how capable they were of accomplishing their objectives.
At present, neither criminal law nor criminal procedure ade-
quately addresses this problem. If the mole or hired gun assumes too
active a role in an undercover investigation, targets may raise the en-
trapment defense or seek dismissal of the indictment, challenging the
government's "over-involvement" as a violation of Due Process. 57 But
the entrapment defense and its Due Process variant focus only on
extreme cases. Most instances where the government participates in
crimes do not count as sufficiently extreme, because most targets are
54. United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1209 (6th Cir. 1980) (informant participated in
forty burglaries); State v. Pooler, 255 N.W.2d 328, 329 (Iowa 1977) (undercover agents partici-
pated in burglary).
55. United States v. Hudacek, 24 F.3d 143, 145 (11th Cir. 1994).
56. United States v. Irving, 827 F.2d 390, 391-92 (8th Cir. 1987) (conviction upheld where
undercover agents assisted defendants by obtaining paper, printing press, printing parapherna-
lia, and vacant office, and thereafter printed $200,001) in counterfeit currency).
57. In dicta, the Supreme Court has suggested that the Due Process Clause may bar a
criminal prosecution when the undercover agents' conduct is sufficiently outrageous to
"shock ... the universal sense of justice" and offend principles of fundamental fairness. United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973). Outrageous conduct may be established by proof of
"an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise." Id. at 424-25;
431-32 (internal quotation omitted). While the Supreme Court limits this defense to defendants
who can demonstrate that they lacked predisposition, some state courts and federal district
courts have applied this constitutional test as a purely objective one, opining that government
over-involvement in the targeted offense may be sufficiently "outrageous" to deprive a defen-
dant of Due Process and warrant dismissal of the charges against him. even if he is "predis-
posed." United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877,883 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Fekri. 650
F.2d 1044, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 427-28 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d
1316, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1978): United States v. Leja, 563 F.2d 244, 246 (6th Cir. 1977).
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only too happy to accept the infiltrator's assistance. The agent's active
role in the criminal plan does nothing to relieve the targets of guilt,
unless the targets lacked predisposition to commit the offense. Focus-
ing as they do on the targets' willingness to commit crimes, entrap-
ment and Due Process defenses do not concern themselves with the
information that agents forego when they carry out a difficult task
themselves instead of waiting for their targets to attempt them, and,
perhaps, fail. The government foregoes opportunities to probe tar-
gets' competence, resources, and resolve because the agents' assis-
tance to their targets make a crime more likely to occur and easier to
prove when it does. Agents may not learn how the target would have
tackled obstacles without government assistance.
A new rule of evidence should be enacted to provide agents with
reasons to reduce their activism and thereby increase what they learn
about their targets. Such a rule would direct the fact-finder to subtract
the undercover agent's contribution from the crimes juries may as-
cribe to defendants. Specifically, judges should direct the juries not to
count the contributions of an undercover agent or infiltrator toward
the actus rets of the crime. If the infiltrator's conduct cannot be at-
tributed to the target, the target herself must perform all actions
essential to the crime in order to incur criminal liability.
How, then, would this proposal work'? Suppose, for example, a
target wanted to print counterfeit money and procured the necessary
negatives. He then asked the undercover agent to provide him with a
printing press. Now assume the undercover agent obtained the paper,
supplied the press, and printed the $200,000 that the target had re-
quested. Under my proposal, the target could not be prosecuted for
manufacturing and possessing $200,000 in counterfeit currency. The
government's conduct could not be attributed to him. The jury could
convict him only of the attempt. By the same token, the quantity that
the government printed should have no influence on the target's sen-
tence, particularly absent any evidence that he could have printed the
money himself. To convict the defendant of anything more than an
inchoate offense, the government would have to leave all essential
contributions to him.
Likewise, suppose an agent is investigating a ring of suspected
burglars. She and her targets drive to a house. While the targets wait
in the car, she enters the residence and steals a stereo. Subtracting her
contribution would make it possible to convict the targets only of
those crimes that they have already committed at the time the agent
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left the car to enter the house. Under my proposal, the agent's con-
duct should be admitted to prove that the targets conspired with each
other to commit a burglary, but not to convict them of the burglary
itself. Had the agent confined herself to acting as a lookout, her
targets would have had to commit the actus reus of the crime them-
selves. Subtracting the agent's modest contribution as a lookout
would not have relieved the targets of liability for the resulting bur-
glary.
A few judges have already adopted this way of thinking. A Mon-
tana appeals court acquitted a defendant who was charged as an ac-
complice for standing watch while undercover agents and informants
committed a burglary. The court reasoned, "If [the infiltrators' con-
duct] is subtracted from the.., break-in, what remains of that mid-
night enterprise is a lone figure, sitting in a parking lot 2 block
away.... [H]is conduct, standing alone, represented no more of a
threat to society than that of a stargazer.., contemplating Polaris.'
8
The court used the government's "over-involvement" in the offense
to acquit the defendant on Due Process grounds, holding that the
undercover agents' role violated fundamental principles of fairness.
Yet this court's approach would not protect the defendant in many
circumstances. First, a Due Process rationale would not have shielded
the defendant if the government had been able to show that the bur-
glary was, in the court's words, "part of ongoing criminal activities
engaged in by [the] defendant prior to his involvement with [the gov-
ernment's agents]."59 Such evidence would have established the de-
fendant's predisposition to participate in the burglary. If the
defendant had a pattern of criminal activity, the court implied, the
government's contribution to the offense would not be sufficiently
unfair to violate the Due Process Clause. Second, there is at present
great uncertainty about how much government involvement is re-
quired to trigger Due Process protection. The Alaska Supreme Court,
for example, distinguished the Montana decision and rejected a Due
Process challenge by a hunting guide convicted for shooting foxes out
of season. Even though the undercover agent rather than the defen-
dant shot the foxes, the court reasoned, the hunting guide could be
convicted because he had piloted the agent over the game preserve
and provided other assistance. Following a Ninth Circuit decision,
60
58. State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268, 274 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
59. Id.
60. United States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th Cir. 1986).
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the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that a defendant could not prevail
on a Due Process challenge unless he established that the government
had "engineered and directed the criminal enterprise from start to
finish."6"
My proposal addresses these shortcomings of Due Process as a
way of constraining undercover policing. My proposal establishes a
criterion for determining how much government involvement is too
much. Any government contribution that relieves the target of the
need to perform some necessary part of the actus reus will remove
criminal liability. The jury may consider only the target's own actions
in deciding whether the government has proved the actus reus of an
offense. Such an evidentiary rule gives the police an incentive to leave
all essential contributions to the target.
My proposal not only establishes a workable criterion of liability
for completed crimes, but does so for attempted offenses as well. This
is important because undercover agents participate not only in com-
pleted crimes but in a variety of inchoate offenses. For example, the
"hired gun" agent does not actually kill the intended victim-he only
invites the target to take out a contract (which is an attempted crime).
My proposal can be implemented for these types of sting operations.
In assessing whether the target's activities go beyond preparatory
conduct to attain the status of an attempt, the court should consider
only the target's (not the agent's) contributions. If the undercover
agent makes an essential contribution to the attempt-say, by dis-
abling alarms-courts should exclude evidence of subsequent conduct
by which the target capitalized on the agent's contributions (say, by
entering a building after the alarms go dead). The agent should en-
sure that the target herself takes a sufficiently active part in the
preparations to implicate her in the attempt. This proposal goes fur-
ther than the entrapment defense because it exonerates even a
predisposed target whenever the undercover agent relieves her of the
need to carry out essential contributions to the attempt.
My proposal would correct for, but not discourage, the many ap-
propriate and desirable interventions by infiltrators. An undercover
agent may need to exert influence to prevent harm to others, or to
61. Vaden v. State, 768 P.2d 1102. 1108 (Alaska 1989). A dissenting opinion argued that the
assistance, in and of itself, was insufficient to incriminate the hunting guide. Citing the decision
in Hohensee, the dissent reasoned, "[wlhen Ithe agent's] conduct is subtracted from the
equation, the conduct of the defendants, however evil the intent which accompanied it, does not
amount to a crime." Id. at 1109.
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divert operations to places where they can best be monitored and
their ill effects contained. An agent might convince terrorists to plant
explosives in an empty building instead of a full one, or suggest taking
an extortion victim's car instead of killing him. These interventions
are desirable, but they raise questions: How should the prosecution
use the evidence, given the government's role in shaping it? How
should the court correct for the influence of the government? Under
my proposal, courts should subtract the infiltrator's contribution from
the assignment of criminal responsibility. Evidence of the govern-
ment's influence should neither aggravate nor mitigate the offense.
Suppose an agent secretly disables a bomb. Evidence that the target
planted the defused explosive would prove a criminal attempt that
was independent of the investigator, not a product of contrivance. If a
loan shark threatens a debtor's life and an undercover agent con-
vinces the shark to take the victim's car instead, the court should ad-
mit the evidence only to prove the extortionate threat, which was
independent of the agent's influence. In these examples, the agent's
contrivance does not compromise the independent character of at
least some chargeable offenses. Admitting the evidence to prove
those independent crimes corrects for the infiltrator's influence.
CONCLUSION
Police infiltration is a powerful tool for obtaining inside informa-
tion about secretive criminal networks. But because infiltration allows
the government to influence the events it investigates, undercover
policing offers investigators a powerful temptation to set aside the
laborious process of obtaining inside information in a quest for an
easy conviction. Proving contrived offenses in place of independent
crimes is one such shortcut. Prosecutors often charge targets with
offenses that the undercover agent facilitated, even when evidence of
those offenses could have been used to illuminate other crimes that
occurred independently of the government. The investigator's influ-
ence on targets also tempts agents with a different kind of shortcut.
By excessively involving themselves in the crimes they investigate,
agents may facilitate the later proof of offenses at the cost of obscur-
ing their target's capabilities, and hence the danger she poses to soci-
ety.
I have proposed an amendment to the rules of evidence that
counteracts these temptations. The rules should limit the purposes for
which juries may consider contrived offenses so as to require the gov-
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ernment, wherever possible, to use infiltration as a means of proving
independent crimes. In addition, the rules should prevent the gov-
ernment from using the infiltrator's actions to supply the acttts retts of
a crime. These reforms would improve undercover operations and
charging decisions alike. They would provide prosecutors with rea-
sons to charge those offenses that best reflect what targets do without
government intervention. And they would provide the police with
incentives to conduct infiltration in ways that reveal, but do not
enhance, the target's own capacities.
But why is it so important to tie the offenses that the government
facilitates to some underlying, independent reality? What is at stake
in regulating undercover policing is whether to treat infiltration pri-
marily as a tool for obtaining convictions or as a technique for inves-
tigating crime. These purposes are in tension with each other. Giving
precedence to the goal of facilitating convictions diverts attention
from the harder challenges of crime control. Unmoored from the task
of clearing up crimes that occur independently of investigators, infil-
trators have every reason to focus their efforts on "soft" targets such
as street-dealers, occasional thieves without a stable fence, and all
manner of opportunity seekers lacking resources and experience. Soft
targets are those least insulated from contact with strangers, least
connected to powerful networks, and most in need of assistance. In
the quest for arrest "stats" and easy convictions, the effort to control
crime may yield to the appearance of doing so.
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